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A, . lack of confidence in the peso's
purchasing power was fundamental to
Mexico's recent currency crisis arid
remains central to the nation's convales-
cence. In establishing a credible commit-
ment to price stability, countries face a
trade-off between 1) adopting institu-
tional forms that limit their government's
ability to generate inflation and 2) relying
on an established reputation for success-
fully controlling the price level. Recog-
nizing that those countries lacking such a
reputation must compensate with strong
institutional limits on their monetary pol-
icy discretion, many economists have
suggested that Mexico replace its central
bank with a currency board.
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To be sure, Mexico made commendable
improvements in its monetary policies
prior to the latest peso crisis. Money
growth and inflation slowed after 1992,
and although Mexican inflation re-
mained above U.S. inflation, the differ-
ential was not increasingly inconsistent
with the official limitation on the peso's
depreciation (see figures 1-3).
2 These
gains, however, were atypical of Mexi-
co's broader experience and too current
to constitute a credible reputation, as last
year's capital flight and subsequent de-
valuation illustrated. Without a well-
established track record, the newly inde-
pendent Bank of Mexico could not
possibly garner the same credibility as
the Bundesbank or the Federal Reserve
System.
Currency boards, by eliminating mone-
tary policy discretion and offering full
currency convertibility, give developing
countries a much stronger, more visible
arrangement for promoting confidence in
their money than do central banks. By
pegging the exchange rate, however, cur-
rency boards eliminate an important
mechanism for hastening an economy's
adjustment to economic shocks.
3
• Establishing a Currency Board
Mexico might split the Bank of Mexico
into an Issuing Department, which
would act as the currency board, and a
separate Banking Department, which
would regulate banks and act as the
lender of last resort
4 At the public's ini-
tiative, the Issuing Department would
buy or sell U.S. dollars against pesos at a
fixed exchange rate. The Mexican legis-
lature would set the exchange rate by
law. Currency boards invest their
reserves in interest-bearing securities of
the reserve country—in Mexico's case,
U.S. securities—and remit the profits to
their government. They typically hold a
small excess of reserves (5 to 10 per-
cent) to provide a buffer against any pos-
sible capital loss.
Such an arrangement would guarantee
the full convertibility of the peso mone-
tary base into dollars, but it would not
underwrite the entire domestic money
stock, since currency boards do not back
bank deposits.
5 To shift wealth from
peso-denominated deposits into dollars,
individuals would first have to acquire
pesos and then exchange them for dol-
lars at the currency board. A Mexican
currency board would need approxi-
mately $9 billion in reserves to fully
underwrite a monetary base of 50 billion
new pesos at current exchange rates.
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To restore faith in the peso's purchas-
ing power, Mexico might consider a
currency board. In contrast to a cen-
tral bank, a currency board would
eliminate monetary policy discretion
and offer full convertibility of pesos
into dollars. The arrangement would,
however, prevent exchange-rate
changes from aiding economic
adjustments.
Unlike a central bank, the Issuing De-
partment would never acquire domestic
assets. Among other things, this pre-
cludes the Issuing Department from
buying Mexican government debt obli-
gations, from lending to state-run indus-
tries, or from making loans to local
banks. This crucial prohibition erects a
wall between the Issuing Department
and the government's fiscal activities,
and also prevents the currency board
from engaging in discretionary mone-
tary policy.
While isolating the currency board from
fiscal policy influences, the prohibition
on acquiring government debt appears to
constrain deficit spending in currency-
board countries. Under currency boards,
Singapore and Hong Kong have typi-
cally operated with government budget
surpluses, while other former British
colonies that abandoned their currency
boards have persistently maintained
large budget deficits.
7• Holding Domestic Debt
Critics of currency boards sometimes
argue that backing 100 percent of the
monetary base with foreign-reserve as-
sets when domestic assets yield more is
needlessly costly. The opportunity cost
of holding foreign reserves, however;
actually reflects home-country risks and
is not a cost of currency boards. If capi-
tal markets are efficient, if capital is per-
fectly mobile, and if all assets are per-
fect substitutes, arbitrage will equate
real returns across countries. The higher
interest rates that investors require of
developing countries offset the risks of
currency devaluation, confiscatory
taxes, and capital restrictions. A cur-
rency board, by providing a stable cur-
rency and by constraining fiscal policy,
may reduce these risks, thereby encour-
aging domestic investment and equaliz-
ing returns. Holding higher-yielding,
but riskier, domestic assets may prove
self-defeating.
• The Monetary Process
Because a Mexican currency board
would provide only pesos against U.S.
dollars, changes in the Mexican money
stock would ultimately depend on Mex-
ico's overall balance-of-payments posi-
tion with the United States.
8 A surplus
would expand Mexico's dollar reserves
and money stock; a deficit would con-
tract them. The underlying adjustment
process is reflexive, relying solely on
private, market-based decisions.
Imagine that, starting from an initial state
of equilibrium, Mexicans decided to
invest in the United States instead of in
their own country. They would exchange
deposits for Mexican pesos at their banks
and exchange pesos for dollars at the cur-
rency board. The supply of pesos would
fall and an overall balance-of-payments
deficit would emerge. Mexican interest
rates might rise, partially counteracting
the desire to invest in the United States
and reducing the demand for pesos in
line with the now-smaller supply. Mexi-
can prices might also fall, encouraging
exports. All of these adjustments follow
without government intervention, but
they may take time, especially if wages
and prices are inflexible, and they may
result in some temporary dislocations as,
for example, resources shift from the pro-
duction of investment-related goods to
the provision of export goods.
A central bank would face similar auto-
matic adjustments, but unlike a currency
board, it can offset—or sterilize—the
contractionary monetary effect of a cap-
ital outflow through expansionary open-
market operations in domestic assets. If
the central bank accurately identifies the
underlying problem causing investors to
pull out of Mexico as transitory, steril-
ization might be useful for avoiding
interim economic dislocations.
If, however, the underlying problem is
uncertainty about government or central
bank policies, sterilization could actually
worsen the capital outflow. Speculators
realize mat when a central bank's official
reserves dwindle, a devaluation follows.
They move funds out of the country and
thereby aggravate the situation. Conse-
quently, while central banks may avoid
adjustment to temporary balance-of-
payment disequilibria, they have no ad-
vantage over currency boards when the
underlying problem is persistent
• Sacrificing Sovereignty
To acquire credibility, a currency-board
country sacrifices monetary sovereignty.
Its money growth and inflation rate will
approximate those of the reserve cur-
rency country. Suppose that the United
States increases its money supply exces-
sively, thereby generating inflation.
Price arbitrage will transmit this infla-
tion to Mexico. As Americans trade dol-
lars for pesos to buy Mexican goods, the
Mexican money supply will automati-
cally increase. This process will con-
tinue until money growth in Mexico
generates an inflation rate roughly equal
to that in the United States, thereby elim-
inating the arbitrage.
Contrary to popular belief, a currency
board does not completely eliminate its
government's ability to influence domes-
tic money growth. Governments in
currency-board countries acquire their
foreign currency assets through
currency-board profits. By selling these
foreign assets and converting the for-
eign exchange into domestic notes at
the currency board, these governments
can finance fiscal policies while simul-
taneously increasing the domestic
money supply.
9 The ability of a govern-
ment to undertake such a policy de-
pends on its holdings of foreign cur-
rency assets (or its ability to borrow
abroad). Unlike discretionary central
bank actions, this policy undermines
neither the currency's backing nor the
currency board's credibility.
• Fixed Exchange Rates
Confidence in a currency-board system
results because it guarantees complete
convertibility at an absolutely fixed
exchange rate. In addition to promoting
monetary credibility, a fixed exchange
rate reduces the transaction costs associ-
ated with exchange-rate volatility. These
can be substantial for small economies
that are heavily dependent on interna-
tional trade and investment Currency
boards, however, prevent exchange-rate
changes from helping an economy adjust
to economic shocks. Consequently, any
cost-benefit analysis of currency boards
must consider the trade-off between
monetary policy credibility and
smoother economic adjustments.
When domestic wages and prices are
inflexible or when international arbitrage
is slow and incomplete, flexible
exchange rates can hasten a country's
adjustment to idiosyncratic economic
disturbances by facilitating rapid changes
in its international competitiveness. As
one might expect, if all countries that
maintain fixed exchange rates experience
similar economic disturbances, changing
their ability to compete against each
other offers no remedy. In this case, fixed
exchange rates are indeed optimal.
A recent study suggests that Mexico and
the United States do not experience sim-
ilar shocks, probably owing to substan-
tial differences in their economic struc-
tures.
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0 This implies that other things
equal, a flexible peso-dollar exchange
rate can benefit both nations. Such flexi-
bility could, for example, promote a
faster, less disruptive balance-of-
payments adjustment between Mexico
and the United States than changes in
prices, incomes, and interest rates might
otherwise do.FIGURE 1 MONEY GROWTH
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However, as NAFTA more closely inte-
grates production processes across the
border, economic fluctuations will prob-
ably become more closely correlated. In
addition, NAFTA—and a currency
board—could increase the financial in-
tegration and the mobility of labor and
capital between the United States and
Mexico. Then, regions experiencing ris-
ing aggregate demand would more
quickly attract both labor andcapitaL
thereby expanding output and equalizing
prices without relying on exchange-rate
changes. One might also expect that
increased competition between Mexico
and the United States will result in more
flexible real wages. When wages and
prices are highly flexible, international
competitiveness can change quickly
without flexible exchange rates.
Fixing its exchange rate to the dollar
could, however, alter Mexico's competi-
tiveness relative to other countries, like
Germany and Japan. As the dollar fluc-
tuates, so will the peso. Mitigating the
severity of this problem is the high pro-
portion of Mexico's trade with the
United States. All things considered,
Mexico has historically preferred a fixed




The benefit of money—its ability to re-
duce transaction costs—is directly tied
to the stability of its purchasing power.
Because governments can generate rev-
enue from unanticipated monetary ex-
pansions, no institutional arrangements
for stabilizing the value of money—.
neither gold standards nor independent
central banks—are completely credible.
Developing countries with histories of
inflation and devaluation must adopt
even stronger institutional restraints than
developed countries if they are to
achieve even moderately comparable
levels of monetary credibility. For coun-
tries like Mexico, currency boards offer
an approach whose costs and benefits
deserve closer consideration.• Footnotes "^
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